Yeah, okay, I admit that headline is cheap click bait. Originally, it said Certificate Pinning on Smartphones. If you are more interested in pin-ups on your smartphone, I fear youll have to look elsewhere :).
Recently, an email provider that I use changed their Internet-facing services completely. I hadnt seen any announcement that this would happen, and the provider likely thought that since the change was transparent to the customer, no announcement was needed. But Im probably a tad more paranoid than their normal customers, and am watching what my home WiFi/DSL is talking to on the Internet. On that day, some device in my home started speaking IMAPS with an IP address block that I had never seen before. Before I even checked which device it was, I pulled a quick traffic capture, to look at the SSL certificate exchange, where I did recognize the domain name, but not the Certificate Authority. Turns out, as part of the change, the provider had also changed their SSL certificates, and even including the certificate issuer (CA).
And my mobile phone, which happened to be the device doing the talking? It hadnt even blinked! And had happily synchronized my mail, and sent my IMAP login information across this session, all day long.
Since I travel often, and am potentially using my phone in less-than-honest locations and nations, it is quite evident that this setup is pretty exposed to a man in the middle attack (MitM). Ironically, the problem would be almost trivial to solve in software, all that is needed is to store the fingerprint of the server certificate locally on the phone, and to stop and warn the user whenever that fingerprint changes. This approach is called Certificate Pinning or Key continuity, and OWASP has a great write-up that explains how it works.
Problem is .. this is only marginally supported in most implementations, and what little support there is, is often limited to HTTPS (web). In other words, all those billions of smart phones which happily latch onto whatever known WiFi or mobile signal is to be had nearby, will just as happily connect to what they think is their mail server, and provide the credentials. And whoever ends up with these credentials, will have access for a while .. or when was the last time YOU changed your IMAP password?
If you wonder how this differs from any other man in the middle (MitM) attack … well, with a MitM in the web browser, the user is actively involved in the connection, and at least stands *some* chance to detect what is going on. With the mobile phone polling for email though, this happens both automatically and very frequently, so even with the phone in the pocket, and a MitM that is only active for five minutes, a breach can occur. And with the pretty much monthly news that some trusted certificate authority mistakenly issued a certificate for someone elses service, well, my mobile phones childishly nave readiness to talk to strangers definitely isnt good news.
While certificate pinning would not completely eliminate this risk, it certainly would remove the most likely attack scenarios. Some smart phones have add-on apps that promise to help with pinning, but in my opinion, the option to pin the certificate on email send/receive is a feature that should come as standard part of the native email clients on all Smartphones. Which we probably should be calling Dumbphones or Navephones, until they actually do provide this functionality.
If your smartphone has native certificate pinning support on imap/pop/smtp with any provider (not just Chrome/GMail), or you managed to configure it in a way that it does, please share in the comments below.
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