ISC Stormcast For Thursday, July 11th 2019 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=6572, (Thu, Jul 11th)

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Reposted from SANS. View original.

Recent AZORult activity, (Thu, Jul 11th)

I found a tweet from @ps66uk from on Monday morning 2019-07-10 about an open directory used in malspam to push an information stealer called AZORult. The open directory is hosted on sfoodfeedf[.]org at www.sfoodfeedf[.]org/wp-includes/Requests/Cookie/

Shown above:  The open directory at sfoodfeedf[.]org.

@ps66uk already mentioned a file named purchase order.iso which is an ISO file containing an executable file for AZORult.  However, I found another one in the same directory named 201907060947039062.iso.  Further analysis showed it was also AZORult, like the other ISO file.

Shown above:  Getting the other ISO file.

Shown above:  Extracting the EXE file from the ISO on a Windows 7 host.

In previous AZORult infections in my lab, the malware usually deleted itself after an initial exfiltration of data.  This one repeatedly did callback traffic, and there was a .vbs file made persistent on my infected Windows host during the infection.  This is apparently a more recent variant of AZORult dubbed AZORult++ as described by Kaspersky Labs and followed-up by BleepingComputer.  It’s called AZORult++ because it’s now compiled in C++ after formerly being compiled in Delphi.

Shown above:  Traffic from the infection filtered in Wireshark.

Shown above:  TCP conversations from my infected Windows host.

Shown above:  An example of the AZORult callback traffic.

Shown above:  This AZORult EXE was compiled with C++, a characteristic of AZORult++.

Shown above:  VBS file made persistent on my infected Windows host.

Malware indicators

SHA256 hash: ed7c0a248904a026a0e3cabded2aa55607626b8c6cfc8ba76811feed157ecea8

• File size: 1,232,384 bytes
• File description AZORult EXE
• Any.Run analysis 
• CAPE sandbox analysis
• Reverse.it analysis

Final words

Earlier this month on 2019-07-01, I saw an AZORult sample (also compiled in C++) which did the expected two HTTP post requests to exfiltrate data, then deleted itself from my infected host.  Today’s example proves there can be some variation in AZORult infection activity.

—
Brad Duncan
brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

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Dumping File Contents in Hex (in PowerShell), (Wed, Jul 10th)

I got to thinking about file dumps in hexadecimal this week.  This is something I do at least a few times a week – usually to look at file headers or non-printable characters for one reason or another.

File headers will usually let you know what type of file you’re looking at (no matter what the file extension is).  More here on that: https://linux.die.net/man/1/file

When looking at or for non-printable characters, this can be for any number of reasons, but almost always it’s to figure out what some crazy application is doing with CRLF (Carriage Return / Line Feed) so that I can fix the output to properly feed the next script or tool, or so that Word will read it correctly (which I guess is the same thing).

Anyway, the go-to tool for this is XXD:

More on XXD here (or type”man xxd”): https://linux.die.net/man/1/xxd

If you’re on a stripped-down Linux version, something like busybox, XXD won’t be there (it comes with VIM, not VI), but often those distro’s will still have the “hexdump” command:

But what if you’re on a customer Windows host?  And what if they haven’t installed any of the Linux tools?  Well, as you might guess, “PowerShell to the rescue!”  Powershell’s “format-hex” command gives you much the same output:

Better yet, format-hex handles multiple encodings, so if you have a specific character encoding to work with, “-encoding” is your friend!  The default is UTF8BOM (for “byte order marker”), “unicode” encoding will give you UTF-16

The full “format-hex” docs are here (along with dozens of other places that google will find for you): https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/format-hex?view=powershell-6
(or “get-help format-hex”)

More on the various encoding options here: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.text.encoding.codepage?view=netcore-2.2

If you’ve seen a situation where you needed a different method to accomplish this task, please use our comment form to share!!

===============
Rob VandenBrink
Coherent Security

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Reposted from SANS. View original.

Samba Project tells us "What's New" – SMBv1 Disabled by Default (finally), (Wed, Jul 10th)

Samba 4.11 (preview release) came out 2 days ago (4.11p0).  Not huge news you say, except for one detail – the default settings on this version now have SMBv1 disabled.  Better yet, they’ve started to set the stage for removing it completely.

Yes, 2 years after WannaCry, Petya, NotPetya Eternal-everything and all the rest, they’ve come around and joined the party.  Mind you, this does not change any settings on existing installations, fixing those is still a manual change.  

Hopefully you’ve used tools like NMAP (nmap -p445 –open –script smb-protocols.nse) to find and fix any hosts that still support SMBv1, which hopefully includes and *nix/SAMBA hosts in your environment.  I’m also hoping that you’ve scanned any “storage appliances”, which mostly are Linux + SAMBA + iSCSI under the covers.  If you haven’t done these scans and remediations, you’ve likely had a some bad days over the last 2 years.

If you require SMBv1 support in Samba, the team requests that you let them know via a bug report.  This gives them the feedback they need to work on scheduling the deprecation and final removal process for the protocol.

Anyway, good news from the Samba project, and better days ahead!

Full release notes are here: https://github.com/samba-team/samba/blob/59cca4c5d699be80b4ed22b40d8914787415c507/WHATSNEW.txt

===============
Rob VandenBrink
Coherent Security

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Reposted from SANS. View original.