This week I started seeing some URL with /dns-query?dns in my honeypot. The queries obviously did not look like a standard DNS queries, this got me curious and then proceeded to investigate to determine what these DNS query were trying to resolve.
But before proceeding, I have logs going back to May 2018 and reviewed the logs to see when this activity was first captured. The first time the honeypot logged something similar was in February 2020 with one long query that was different to all other queries. All the logs are targeting TCP/443 and are unencrypted.
Using base64 URL safe option in CyberChef, I was able to decode the DNS information for the 3 different queries. The first query captured in February 2020 appears to be a test (see decoded information below). The other two resolve to a URL: one as a test (www.example[.]com) and the other to Baidu search engine (www.baidu[.]com).
- tcp-honeypot-20200212-195552.log:20200226-230039: 192.168.25.9:443-188.8.131.52:59822 data ‘GET /dns-query?dns=AAABAAABAAAAAAAAAWE-NjJjaGFyYWN0ZXJsYWJlbC1tYWtlcy1iYXNlNjR1cmwtZGlzdGluY3QtZnJvbS1zdGFuZGFyZC1iYXNlNjQHZXhhbXBsZQNjb20AAAEAAQ HTTP/1.1rnHost: XX.30.102.198:443rnConnection: closernAccept-Encoding: gziprnUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_5) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/50.0.2661.102 Safari/537.36rnrn’
- tcp-honeypot-20200413-081332.log:20200413-171212: 192.168.25.9:443-184.108.40.206:40634 data ‘GET /dns-query?dns=AAABAAABAAAAAAAAA3d3dwdleGFtcGxlA2NvbQAAAQAB HTTP/1.1rnHost: XX.30.102.198rnUser-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1rnAccept-Encoding: gziprnConnection: closernrn’
- 20210112-110540: 192.168.25.9:443-220.127.116.11:60736 data ‘GET /dns-query?dns=AAABAAABAAAAAAAAA3d3dwViYWlkdQNjb20AAAEAAQ HTTP/1.1rnHost: XX.49.33.78rnUser-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1rnAccept: application/dns-messagernAccept-Encoding: gziprnConnection: closernrn’
- 20210113-040125: 192.168.25.9:443-18.104.22.168:49778 data ‘GET /dns-query?dns=AAABAAABAAAAAAAAA3d3dwViYWlkdQNjb20AAAEAAQ HTTP/1.1rnHost: XX.49.33.78rnUser-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1rnAccept: application/dns-messagernAccept-Encoding: gziprnConnection: closernrn’
Base64 Decoded Queries
- AAABAAABAAAAAAAAAWE-NjJjaGFyYWN0ZXJsYWJlbC1tYWtlcy1iYXNlNjR1cmwtZGlzdGluY3QtZnJvbS1zdGFuZGFyZC1iYXNlNjQHZXhhbXBsZQNjb20AAAEAAQ ………….a>62characterlabel-makes-base64url-distinct-from-standard-base64.example.com…..
- AAABAAABAAAAAAAAA3d3dwViYWlkdQNjb20AAAEAAQ ………….www.baidu.com…..
- AAABAAABAAAAAAAAA3d3dwdleGFtcGxlA2NvbQAAAQAB ………….www.example.com…..
DNS Queries by Base64 String
- IP Activity resolving to www.example[.]com has been active since April 2020 with 2 packets per month.
- User-Agent → Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DNSResearchBot/2.1; +http://22.214.171.124)
- IP Activity resolving to www.baidu[.]com only started in December 2020 and has been active since then.
- User-Agent → Go-http-client/1.1
- IP Activity resolving to 62characterlabel-makes-base64url-distinct-from-standard-base64.example.com only seen once in February 2020 which appears to be only a test.
- Something interesting, 62characterlabel-makes-base64url-distinct-from-standard-base64 is equal to 62 characters
- User-Agent → Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_5) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/50.0.2661.102 Safari/537.36
Do you have similar obfuscated DNS queries in your logs? Please use our comment form to share them.
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