Not a technical diary today but more a reflection… When I’m teaching FOR610, I always remind students to “RTFM” or “Read the F… Manual”. I mean to not hesitate to have a look at the Microsoft document when they meet an API call for the first time or if they are not sure about the expected parameters.
Many attackers have a very deep knowledge of how targeted operating systems are behaving and what are the controls in place or features that could be (ab)used by malicious code. When you’re analyzing malware samples, it’s very important to quickly spot interesting blocks of code (by learning which interesting OS feature they use). A classic example is the API call
VirtualAllocEx() which allocates a region of memory within the virtual address space of a specified process:
LPVOID VirtualAllocEx( HANDLE hProcess, LPVOID lpAddress, SIZE_T dwSize, DWORD flAllocationType, DWORD flProtect );
hProcess is a handle to a process returned by
OpenProcess(). Then, you use
WriteProcessMemory() to write specified contents into the memory of the targeted process. When you read this, you can ask yourself: “Wait… why does Microsoft allow a process to inject code into another process?”. The answer is simple: because it’s a key feature of the operating system and it can be used for many totally legit reasons. Think about antivirus programs! It’s common that AV injects code into processes of a process (ex: in browsers to inspect downloaded data).
API calls are a key aspect of malware, not only the function itself but also its options. Here is another example: If you see a
VirtualProtect, check the last parameter:
LPVOID VirtualAlloc( LPVOID lpAddress, SIZE_T dwSize, DWORD flAllocationType, DWORD flProtect );
flProtect allows you to set the memory protection for the region of pages to be allocated. If you see the value 0x40 (PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) set for this parameter, it means the newly allocated memory will contain executable code!
An approach to flag some sample during the triage process is to identify the group of API’s that are used to perform suspicious actions like:
- Code injection
- DLL operations
- Dropping 2nd stage
In my triage process, I use FLOSS because it can extract a lot of API calls from strings, stack strings, etc… Then I parse the output to YARA to match interesting groups of API. Example:
[email protected]:/MalwareZoo/20210316$ floss sample.exe | ./yarawrapper.py suspicious-api-calls.yara Matching: api_address_search Matching: dll_operations
Why YARA? Because it helps to create useful rules like “any of this”, “all of this”, and, or, groups of APIs. A sample of YARA rules is available here.
Xavier Mertens (@xme)
Senior ISC Handler – Freelance Cyber Security Consultant
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.